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Abstract
We provide a natural learning process in which the joint frequency of (time-averaged) empirical play converges into the set of
convex combinations of Nash equilibria. Furthermore, the actual distribution of players’ actions is close to some (approximate)
Nash equilibria on most rounds (on all but a vanishing fraction of the rounds). In this process, all players rationally choose their
actions using a public prediction made by a deterministic, weakly calibrated algorithm. For this to be possible, we show that such
a deterministic (weakly) calibrated learning algorithm exists.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Perhaps the most central question for justifying any game theoretic equilibrium as a general solution concept is: can
we view the equilibrium as a convergent point of a sensible learning process? Unfortunately for Nash equilibria, there
are currently few learning algorithms in the literature in which play generally converges (in some sense) to a Nash
equilibrium of the one shot game. Furthermore, few notions of individual rationality are involved in such processes.
The most commonly studied learning process (and arguably the most natural one) are those in which, at each round,
players make predictions of their opponents and then take best responses based on their predictions (see [31]). The
widely-studied fictitious play [3] falls into this category.
Here, we study this learning process under a setting in which players make calibrated predictions. Crudely speak-
ing, the calibration condition is a bias condition in which the observed empirical frequencies (asymptotically, on
average) equal their predicted probabilities—it can be viewed as a rather minimal check that the predictions are of
reasonable quality. In this setting where players make calibrated predictions, Foster and Vohra [8] showed how play
converges (in some sense) to the set of correlated equilibria (a set possibly much bigger than the set of Nash equilibria).
Previous calibration algorithms were limited to randomized algorithms, since it was shown that deterministic algo-
rithms are not calibrated in the worst case [7,28]. In this paper, we show how a very natural relaxation of the calibration
definition (which we term weak calibration) can be satisfied with a deterministic algorithm. We then consider the im-
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empirical play converges to a Nash equilibrium, if it is unique. More generally, if the equilibria is not unique, the play
is close to some (approximate) Nash equilibria on most rounds (on all but a vanishing fraction of rounds)—the play
at each round can jump from one Nash equilibrium to another, perhaps infinitely often.
A notable distinction of our convergence results (as compared to the other recent convergence results to Nash
equilibria [1,13,14,18,21]) is that in our learning process the players are guaranteed to make calibrated predictions
regardless of how the other players behave (and we satisfy the “no regret” condition with respect to their actions1).
Meaning that even if some players deviate from the prescribed protocol in the learning process (and so play may not
convergence to Nash), those players that do follow the protocol will still make calibrated predictions (and will have
“no-regret”)—this is due to the fact that every player is using a calibrated algorithm in the protocol.
In the remainder of the introduction, we sketch our main contributions, on deterministic calibration and on Nash
convergence. We also discuss related work to ours. The remainder of the paper is as follows: first, the precise definition
of the weak calibration condition is provided, then our learning process and learning results are provided, and finally,
a existence proof that a weakly calibrated algorithm exists is given. A preliminary version of this paper is [22].
1.1. Deterministic calibration
Formulating sensible prediction algorithms is a notoriously difficult task in the game theoretic setting.2 A rather
minimal requirement for any prediction algorithm is that it should be calibrated (see [6]). An informal explanation
of calibration would go something like this. Suppose each day a weather forecaster makes some prediction, say p,
of the chance that it rains the next day. Now from the subsequence of days on which the forecaster announced p
(or some number “close” to p), compute the empirical frequency that it actually rained the next day, and call this
ρ(p). Roughly speaking, calibration requires that ρ(p) equal p, if the forecast p is used often. Roughly speaking, this
condition demands that predictions be (conditionally) unbiased.
If the weather acts adversarially, then Oakes [28] and Dawid [7] show that a deterministic forecasting algorithm
will not be calibrated in the worst case. Subsequently, Foster and Vohra [9] show that calibration is almost surely
guaranteed with a randomized forecasting rule. Here, the forecasts are chosen using private randomization (roughly
speaking, the forecasts must be hidden from the weather until the weather makes its decision to rain or not).
Although stronger notions of calibration have been proposed (see [25]), here we actually consider a relaxed notion.
In this paper, we define a notion of weak calibration based on the weak convergence of measures [2]. Intuitively, our
definition of weak calibration can be considered a smoothed version the previous definition. Our contribution is to
provide a deterministic algorithm that is always weakly calibrated.
The existence of such a deterministic scheme has important implications. First, this result shows precisely how
randomization is not intrinsic to the notion of calibration. Second, if one wants to achieve calibration in the usual
sense, we show that just randomized rounding is sufficient.3 This rounding scheme is similar to those used in [10,17].
Second, the existence of a deterministic algorithm has important implications in a game theoretic setting. Namely,
learning processes with Nash convergence properties are possible using calibrated learning rules.
We also provide convergence rates for this notion of calibration, that are O(
√
T ) (where T is the number of rounds).
This convergence rate depends on a certain Lipschitz parameter, which is used to judge the degree of how fine the
calibration is (this is made precise in Lemma 4.3).
Subsequent to this work, Vovk [30] has considered a variety of generalizations of the calibration results presented
herein. These include a setting where there is side information which is present at the time of prediction. Vovk focuses
on both calibration and resolution (see [30] for details) and provides convergence rates in a number of settings.
1 The “no-regret” property (specifically, no internal regret) is the condition that retrospectively, on average, the player should not have been able
to obtain more reward if on those times she played action “a”, she had played some other fixed action “b” instead. It is straightforward to see that
if one is calibrated and one takes best responses then one has no regret with respect to actions.
2 Subjective notions of probability fall prey to a host of impossibility results—crudely, Alice wants to predict Bob while Bob wants to predict
Alice, which leads to recursive difficulties in defining their predictions. See [12].
3 We use the term randomized rounding, as in the approximation algorithms literature. A real number can be “randomly rounded” to some degree
of precision based on digits that will be lost, so the expectation of the rounded number is precisely equal to the original number. E.g. 0.8312 can be
rounded to two degrees of precision—the outcome being 0.84 with probability 0.12 and being 0.83 with probability 0.88.
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linear regression algorithms. This algorithm provides another simple (and more general) proof of deterministic, weak
calibration and makes a link to notions of regret and loss (namely the square loss) commonly used in machine learning.
1.2. Nash convergence
With regards to Nash convergence, there is a long list of special cases (e.g. zero sum games, 2 × 2 games, as-
sumptions about the players’ prior subjective beliefs) in which there exist learning processes that have been shown to
have Nash convergence (a representative but far from exhaustive list would be [15,16,24,27,29]). Obtaining learning
processes which robustly and more generally converge to Nash equilibria has been somewhat elusive, and only rela-
tively recently has their been learning processes under which general converge to Nash equilibria is possible [1,13,14,
18,21].
In contrast, there are number of relatively simple learning processes for convergence to the set of correlated equi-
libria (see [31] for review). The first of these was the result of Foster and Vohra [8], showing that if players make
predictions that satisfy the calibration condition, then the joint frequency of the empirical play converges into the set
of correlated equilibria. This result is illuminating in that it does not demand that players must follow any particular
prediction algorithm—only that the players must satisfy the rather minimal calibration condition (in practice, players
might hope their prediction algorithms actually do better). Furthermore, since calibrated prediction algorithms exist
using private randomization (where the random outcomes of the prediction algorithm are private), convergence to the
set of correlated equilibria can be guaranteed in all games.
Having established the existence of a deterministic forecasting algorithm, it is only natural to consider the implica-
tions of determinism in learning. Intuitively, a deterministic forecasting rule relegates the need for players to privately
make predictions—as far as weak calibration is concerned, players no longer need any randomization. The setting we
consider is one in which all the players observe a prediction of the full joint distribution of their joint action. Using
this prediction, every player takes some (approximate) best response.
Here, we prove the stronger condition that the joint frequency of empirical play converges into the set of convex
combinations of Nash equilibria, a smaller set than that of correlated equilibria. This directly implies that the average
payoff achieved by each player is at least the player’s payoff under some Nash equilibrium—a stronger guarantee
than achieving a (possibly smaller) correlated equilibrium payoff. Furthermore, we show that actual play (during
each round) is frequently close to some Nash equilibrium (not general combinations of them). This setting deals with
the coordination problem of “which Nash equilibrium to play?” in a natural manner. The setting does not arbitrarily
force play to any single equilibrium and allows the possibility that players could (jointly) switch play from one Nash
equilibrium to another—perhaps infinitely often.
Our convergence rates, until the empirical play is an approximate Nash equilibrium (in any reasonable sense), are
not polynomial time. In some sense, this is not particularly surprising in light of the recent negative computational
complexity results for Nash equilibria [4,5]. In contrast, computing correlated equilibria is much simpler and the
convergence rates in learning processes to (approximate) correlated equilibria are often polynomial in the relevant
natural quantities (e.g. [11]).
1.3. Related convergence results
The hypothesis testing setting of Foster and Young [13] (see also [14]) is closest in spirit to this work. Here, players
make predictions of their opponents’ play and take best responses—if they find (after performing some “statistical
test”) that their hypothesis, of how their opponents are playing, is wrong then they (randomly) choose a new hypothesis
of how their opponents’ play. This work is similar to our setting in that players are taking best responses based on their
beliefs of their opponents play. However, as we mentioned earlier, in our setting, there is the additional guarantee that
even if some players deviate from the specified protocol, those players that follow the protocol will make calibrated
predictions.
Hart and Mas-Colell [21] consider both possibility and impossibility results for Nash convergence, ignoring ra-
tionality aspects. They show that Nash convergence is possible if some memory is used (while without memory and
certain other constraints Nash convergence is not possible).
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Here, more sophisticated dynamical systems are studied which allow (under certain conditions) convergence to Nash
equilibria. These dynamical systems are not as myopic as those considered by Hart and Mas-Colell [20], in which an
impossibility result was proved in a continuous time setting in which updates are not memory dependent.5 Recently,
Mannor et al. [26] also studied continuous time extensions of the setting presented here (also using weak calibration)
and provided conditions under which convergence to Nash equilibria may occur.
We should note that many of these results all slightly differ in their notion of convergence. The strongest version
of convergence is provided by Germano and Lugosi [18]. Here, Germano and Lugosi [18] consider an extension of
the regret testing framework of Foster and Young [14] and provide a protocol in which the actual play converges to
a single exact equilibrium almost surely. We comment on the distinctions between our convergence results and those
provided by Foster and Young [13], Hart and Mas-Colell [21], Germano and Lugosi [18] in the discussion.
2. Deterministic calibration
We first describe the online prediction setting. There is a finite outcome space Ω = {1,2, . . . , |Ω|}. Let X be an
infinite sequence of outcomes, whose t th element, Xt , indicates the outcome on time t . For convenience, we represent
the outcome Xt = (Xt [1],Xt [2], . . . ,Xt [|Ω|]) as a binary vector in {0,1}|Ω| that indicates which state at time t
was realized—if the realized state was i, then the ith component of Xt is 1 and all other components are 0. Hence,
1
T
∑T
t=1 Xt is the empirical frequency of the outcomes up to time T and is a valid probability distribution.
A forecasting method, F , is simply a function from a sequence of outcomes to a probability distribution over Ω .
The forecast that F makes in time t is denoted by ft = F(X1,X2, . . . ,Xt−1) (clearly, the t th forecast must be made
without knowledge of Xt ). Here ft = (ft [1], ft [2], . . . , ft [|Ω|]), where the ith component is the forecasted probabil-
ity that state i will be realized in time t .
2.1. Weak calibration
We now define a quantity to determine if F is calibrated with respect to some probability distribution p. Define
Ip,(f ) to be a “test” function indicating if the forecast f is -close to p, i.e.
Ip,(f ) =
{
1 if |f − p| ,
0 else
where |f | denotes the 1 norm, i.e. |f | =∑k∈Ω |f [k]|. We define the calibration error μT of F with respect to Ip,
as:
μT (Ip,,X,F ) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
Ip,(ft )(Xt − ft ).
Note that Xt − ft is the immediate error (which is a vector) and the above error μT measures this instantaneous error
on those times when the forecast was -close to p.
We say that F is calibrated if for all sequences X and all test functions Ip, , the calibration error tends to the zero
vector, i.e.
μT (Ip,,X,F ) → 0
as T tends to infinity.
As discussed in the introduction, there exist no deterministic rules F that are calibrated [7,28]. However, Foster
and Vohra [9] show that there exist randomized forecasting rules F (i.e. F is a randomized function) which are
calibrated. Namely, there exists a randomized F such that for all sequences X and for all test functions Ip, , the error
4 Related to this, much of the analysis of the convergence of fictitious play (in a continuous time setting) essentially uses techniques from control
theory.
5 They show that, in general, there exists no continuous time dynamics which converge to a Nash equilibrium (even if the equilibrium is unique),
with the natural restriction that a players mixed strategy is updated without using the knowledge of the other players’ utility functions.
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randomization used by the forecasting scheme).
We now generalize this definition of the calibration error by defining it with respect to arbitrary test functions w,
where a test function is defined as a mapping from probability distributions into the interval [0,1]. We define the
calibration error μT of F with respect to the test function w as:
μT (w,X,F ) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
w(ft )(Xt − ft ).
This is consistent with the previous definition if we set w=Ip, .
Let W be the set of all test functions which are Lipschitz continuous functions.6 We say that F is weakly calibrated
if for all sequences X and all w ∈ W ,
μT (w,X,F ) → 0
as T tends to infinity.
We might desire a notion of convergence which has a uniform rate. Define Wλ to be the class of all Lipschitz
continuous functions with a Lipschitz parameter7 of λ. We say that F is uniformly, weakly calibrated if for all finite λ,
sup
X,w∈Wλ
μT (w,X,F ) → 0
as T tends to infinity. The latter condition is strictly stronger. Our first main result follows.
Theorem 2.1 (Deterministic calibration). There exists a deterministic forecasting rule F which is uniformly, weakly
calibrated.
The proof of this theorem is constructive and is presented in Section 4. The proof shows how the convergence rate
depends on the Lipschitz parameter λ.
2.2. Randomized rounding for standard calibration
We now show how to achieve calibration in the standard sense (with respect to the indicator functions Ip, ), using
a deterministic weakly calibrated algorithm along with some randomized rounding. Essentially, randomized rounding
suffices—the algorithm rounds any forecast to some element in a finite set, V , of forecasts.
Let Δ be the simplex in which the forecasts live (Δ ⊂R|Ω|). Consider some triangulation of Δ. By this, we mean
that Δ is partitioned into a set of simplices such that any two simplices intersect in either a common face, common
vertex, or not at all. Let V be the vertex set of this triangulation. Note that any point p lies in some simplex in this
triangulation, and, slightly abusing notation, let V (p) be the set of corners for this simplex.8 Informally, our rounding
scheme rounds a point p to nearby points in V —p will be randomly mapped into V (p) in the natural manner.
It turns out that using a triangulation is not crucial (and other coverings can suffice, as long as appropriate round-
ing scheme is used). We use a triangulation for simplicity (since each point can be represent uniquely by a linear
combination of points in the triangulation).
Let us first provide an example.
Example 2.2. Assume the weather forecaster uses a weakly calibrated algorithm and publicly announces forecasts to
a number of observers interested in the weather. Say the following forecasts are made over some period of 5 days:
0.8606, 0.2387, 0.57513, 0.4005, 0.069632, . . . .
How can an interested observer make calibrated predictions (with respect to Ip,) using this announced forecast? An
observer can just randomly round the forecasts in order to calibrate. For example, if the observer rounds to the second
6 The function g is Lipschitz continuous if g is continuous and if there exists a finite constant λ such that |g(a) − g(b)| λ|a − b|.
7 A Lipschitz function g has Lipschitz parameter λ if |g(a) − g(b)| λ|a − b|.
8 If this simplex is not unique, i.e. if p lies on a edge or vertex, then choose any adjacent simplex.
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the second day, the private predictions will be 0.24 with probability 0.87 and 0.23 otherwise. Under this scheme, the
asymptotic calibration error of the observer will, almost surely, be small (and if the observer rounded to the third digit,
this error would be yet even smaller).
To formalize this, we now associate a test function wv(p) with each v ∈ V as follows. These test functions also
serve in defining the rounding procedure. Each distribution p can be uniquely written as a weighted average of its
neighboring vertices, V (p). For v ∈ V (p), let us define the test functions wv(p) to be these linear weights, so they
are uniquely defined by the linear equation:
p =
∑
v∈V (p)
wv(p)v.
For v /∈ V (p), we define wv(p) = 0. A useful property is that∑
v∈V (p)
wv(p) =
∑
v∈V
wv(p) = 1
which holds since p is an average (under wv) of the points in V (p).
Using these test functions, we define the randomized rounding function in the natural way. Define the randomized
rounding function RoundV as follows: for some distribution p, RoundV (p) chooses v ∈ V (p) with probability wv(p).
An immediate corollary to the previous theorem is that rounding F onto the grid V (i.e. using RoundV ◦ F ), leads
to approximate calibration with respect to the indicator test functions. In the following, | · | denotes the 1 norm.
Corollary 2.3. Assume that the diameter of any simplex in the triangulation is less than δ, i.e. for any q and q ′ in
the same simplex, |q − q ′|  δ. If F is weakly calibrated, then for all X, the calibration error of RoundV ◦ F is
asymptotically less than δ, i.e. with probability one, for all indicator functions Ip,
lim sup
T→∞
∣∣μT (Ip,,X,RoundV ◦ F)∣∣ δ
where the probability is with respect to the randomization used by RoundV .
Note that for sufficiently small δ the algorithm can hardly be considered to be randomizing, as all its predictions
can be made arbitrarily close to a deterministic point. This may seem like an apparent contradiction, as at δ = 0
deterministic calibration is not possible. However, the convergence rate increases as δ becomes smaller, tending to
infinity as δ tends to 0.
Proof. Let f ′t be the random outcome of RoundV (ft ), where ft is the forecast used by F at time t . Since the rounding
scheme only makes predictions from the set V (i.e. f ′t ∈ V ), we only need to concern ourselves with the behavior of
the indicator functions on this set. For a subset J ⊆ V , define IJ (f ) to be 1 if f ∈ V and 0 otherwise. The proof
consists of showing that the calibration error of IJ for all J ⊆ V is asymptotically less than δ, with probability
one. This implies the claim above, since every Ip, behaves identically to some IJ when the rounding scheme is
used—by this, we mean that for every Ip, , there exists some J ∈ V such that Ip,(f ) = IJ (f ) for all f ∈ V , and
so Ip,(f
′
t ) = IJ (f ′t ) for all t . (Note that J may not be a singleton since the -ball around p could contain multiple
points from V .)
Consider some subset J ⊆ V . If J is the singleton q , then it is clear that the expected value of the instantaneous
error IJ (f
′
t )(Xt − f ′t ) is just wq(ft )(Xt − q). For the general case, define the test function w(f ) =
∑
q∈J wq(f ).
Here, the expected value of the instantaneous error IJ (f ′t )(Xt − f ′t ) is just w(ft )(Xt − q).
Now the (martingale) strong law of large numbers implies that the sum error 1
T
∑T
t=1 IJ (f ′t )(Xt − f ′t ) converges
to its expectation, 1
T
∑T
t=1 w(ft )(Xt − q). This latter quantity is δ close (in an 1 sense) to the calibration error
μT (w,X,F ) (since q and ft are δ close whenever wq is nonzero). Since this latter error goes to 0 by Theorem 2.1,
we have shown that with probability one,
lim sup
T→∞
∣∣μT (IJ ,X,RoundV ◦ F)∣∣ δ.
Since there are a finite number of subsets J , then the above claim must be true for all J , with probability one. 
S.M. Kakade, D.P. Foster / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 74 (2008) 115–130 121This randomized scheme is “almost deterministic” in the sense that at each time t the forecast made by RoundV ◦F
is δ-close to a deterministic forecast. Interestingly, this shows that an adversarial nature cannot foil the forecaster, even
if nature almost knows the forecast that will be used every round.
3. Publicly calibrated learning
First, some preliminaries are in order. We then provide the learning process, in which all players act in response to
public predictions made by some F , and we show Nash convergence in this setting.
3.1. Preliminaries
Consider a game with n players. Each player i has a finite action space Ai . The joint action space is then A =∏n
i=1Ai . Associated with each player is a payoff function ui :A→ [0,1]. The interpretation is that if the joint action
a ∈A is taken by all players then player i will receive payoff ui(a).
Given some distribution f over A, it is convenient to denote the marginal distribution of f over A−i as f−i .9 We
say a distribution f is a Nash equilibrium if the following two conditions hold: first, f is a product distribution, and
second, all players take best responses, i.e. for all players i and actions a′ ∈Ai
E
[
ui(a)
]
E
[
ui(a
′, a−i )
]
where the expectation is with respect to a sampled from f (and a′ is a constant).
Similarly, we say f is an -Nash equilibrium if we weaken the latter condition to be: all players take -best
responses, i.e. if for all players i and actions a′ ∈Ai ,
E
[
ui(a)
]
E
[
ui(a
′, a−i )
]− .
We denote the set of all Nash equilibria (or -Nash equilibria) by NE (or NE ).
3.2. The public learning process
We work in a repeated game setting, where at every round/timestep t , each player i takes some action and receives
a payoff ui(a) where a is the joint action taken in the round. A standard framework in this learning paradigm is for
each player i to make some forecast p—a distribution over A−i—at time t . The action taken by player i during this
time would then be some action that is a best response to p. Fictitious play falls into this category.
We let Xt be random variable which is the joint action taken at time t . It is convenient to represent this outcome
as a binary vector of length |A| (as in Section 2), where only the ath component is 1 if the joint action a is taken at
time t .
In many learning processes, such as those of fictitious play, players make predictions of their opponents and take
best responses. We consider a setting in this framework. The key difference is that in our setting players make predic-
tions consistent with some joint distribution.
Specifically, consider the setting in which all players observe some forecast f of the behavior of all n players, i.e.
the forecast f is a full joint probability distribution over Ω =A. The key assumption in the public learning process is
that every player’s behavior is only a function of this f . More formally, if the forecast is ft at time t , then we assume
that each player i acts independently according to the response function πi(ft ). Here, πi(ft ) is a distribution over the
action set Ai . Later, we will consider the setting where these f are the output of a weakly calibrated algorithm.
Let π(f ) be the joint distribution over A of how players act when f is announced, i.e. π(f ) is the product
distribution π1(f )π2(f ) . . . πn(f ). It is convenient to think of the distribution π(ft ) as being a vector of length A.
With this convention, π(ft ) is the expected value of Xt .
An important issue is: what constraints should be placed on these response functions? The simplest one is that each
player just deterministically takes a best response to f−i . However, this response function is discontinuous (the best
response action could change sharply with a slight change in f ). In our case, it is natural to consider continuous -best
9 Here A−i denotes the action space with players i action excluded.
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considered by Foster and Young [13]). We say that πi(f ) is a continuous -best response function if the following
two conditions hold: (1) πi(f ) is an -best response to f−i and (2) πi(·) is a continuous function when viewed as a
mapping from distributions over A to distributions over Ai .
Intuitively, the setting is one where all players just take -best responses to some common knowledge forecast.
We make the natural constraint that the response function is continuous, since the calibration guarantees are also
continuous. Also note that if players took strict best responses, then they might be acting deterministically.
A concrete example of such a response function is now provided.
Example 3.1. Assume some vertex set V . At each time t , F provides a prediction ft and each player i:
(i) independently makes a prediction p = RoundV (ft ),
(ii) chooses a best response to p−i .
Importantly, note that each player rounds independently.
If each simplex in the triangulation has diameter δ (as defined in Corollary 2.3), then it is straightforward to show
that the players are taking 2δ best responses to ft .10 Furthermore, their response functions are continuous, where we
can view the randomness in the responses as arising from using RoundV ◦ f .
Furthermore, the forecasting rule of player i is calibrated regardless of how the other players behave. This is
because the forecasting rule that player i uses is a marginal distribution, which must calibrated if the joint is calibrated.
Specifically, Corollary 2.3 implies that the randomized scheme RoundV (ft ) will be δ-calibrated.
The setting of “publicly announced” forecasts is only one way to view the scheme. Alternatively, one could assume
that each player has knowledge of the deterministic rule F and makes the computations of ft themselves. Furthermore,
F only needs the history of play as an input (and does not need any knowledge of the players’ utility functions).
3.3. Nash convergence
Define the distance between a distribution p and a set Q as:
d(p,Q) = inf
q∈Q |p − q|
where again | · | denotes the 1 norm. Similarly, we overload notation and define the distance d(p,q) between two
distributions p and q as |p − q|.
Using the result of Foster and Vohra [11], it is immediate that the frequency of empirical play in the public learning
process will (almost surely) converge into the set of -correlated equilibria, i.e.
d
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
Xt,CE
)
→ 0
where CE is the set of -correlated equilibria. This holds for all  > 0. This essentially follows from the fact that
each player is guaranteed to have no-regret in this setting, regardless of what the other players do.11
However, our second main result shows we can further restrict the convergent set. Recall that π(f ) is the (product)
joint distribution over A of how players act when f is announced, i.e. π(f ) is π1(f )π2(f ) . . . πn(f ).
Theorem 3.2 (Nash convergence). Assume that the forecasting rule F is weakly calibrated and that all players act
according to the -best response functions πi(·). The following three conditions hold:
10 To see this, let a be an action that is a best response to p, with utility u under distribution p. The utility of a under distribution ft is δ close to
u (by the definition of δ). Now, let a′ be a best response to ft , with utility u′ under this distribution. By a similar argument, a′ has utility under p
that is δ close to its utility under ft . Hence, a′ must have utility under p that is 2δ close to the utility of a.
11 To see this, roughly speaking, note that by (continuously) basing actions on calibrated forecasts, then the regret of any player is no more than .
See [11,19] for more discussion about no-regret learning.
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with probability one
1
T
T∑
t=1
d(ft ,NE) → 0
as T goes to infinity.
(ii) (Playing Nash) The play distribution over A is rarely not close to an -Nash equilibrium—meaning that with
probability one
1
T
T∑
t=1
d
(
π(ft ),NE
)→ 0
as T goes to infinity.
(iii) (Merging) The forecasts are rarely not close to the play distribution—meaning that with probability one
1
T
T∑
t=1
d
(
ft ,π(ft )
)→ 0
as T goes to infinity.
As we stated in the introduction, we argue that the above result deals with the coordination problem of “which
Nash equilibrium to play?” in a sensible manner. Though the players cannot be pinned down to play any particular
Nash equilibrium, they are all playing some (approximate) Nash equilibrium, for all but a vanishing fraction of rounds.
Furthermore, it is public knowledge as to which equilibrium is being played since the predictions ft are frequently
close to some Nash equilibrium (not general combinations of them).
The notion of merging is similar to that provided in [25], which, roughly speaking, is a concept in which the
forecasts agree with the true underlying distribution at each timestep. This is a stronger condition than calibration
which only requires that predictions agree with certain empirical frequencies in the long run.
The following corollary shows that we have further restricted the empirical play to the convex combinations of
Nash equilibria, a potentially much smaller set than the set of correlated equilibria. It is useful to make the following
definitions. Let Convex(Q) be the set of all convex combinations of distributions in Q.12
Corollary 3.3. Under the assumptions in the previous theorem, the joint frequency of empirical play converges into
the set of convex combinations of -Nash equilibria, i.e. with probability one
d
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
Xt,Convex(NE)
)
→ 0
as T goes to infinity.
Since our convergence is with respect to the joint empirical play, an immediate corollary is that the average payoff
achieved by each player is at least the player’s payoff under some -Nash equilibrium (a guarantee which is stronger
than just guaranteeing players receive the payoff of some -correlated equilibrium).
3.4. The proof
Recall from Section 3.2 that when ft is forecasted, each player i acts independently according to πi(ft ) and that
the joint (product) distribution over A is π(ft ). Also recall that Xt is the random variable which is the joint action
taken at time t and that with our notational convention, π(ft ) is the expected value of Xt .
First, let us establish two lemmas which suggest how to proceed with a proof.
12 If q1, q2, . . . , qm ∈ Q then α1q1 + α2q2 + · · · + αmqm ∈ Convex(Q), where αi are positive and sum to one.
124 S.M. Kakade, D.P. Foster / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 74 (2008) 115–130Lemma 3.4. For all Lipschitz continuous test functions w, with probability one, we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
w(ft )
(
ft − π(ft )
)→ 0
as T tends to infinity.
Proof. Consider the stochastic process Yτ = 1τ
∑τ
t=1 w(ft )(Xt − π(ft )). This is a martingale average (i.e. τYτ is a
martingale), since at every round, the expected value of Xt is π(ft ). By the martingale strong law we have Yτ → 0
as τ tends to infinity, with probability one. Also, by calibration, we have 1
τ
∑τ
t=1 w(ft )(ft − Xt) → 0 as τ tends to
infinity. Combining these two leads to the result. 
It is straightforward to show that fixed points of π are approximate Nash equilibria.
Lemma 3.5. If f = π(f ), then f is an -Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By definition, π(f ) is a product distribution. Also, by definition, each player i uses a mixed strategy πi(f )
that is an -best responses to f . If f = π(f ), then the claim follows. 
Taken together, these last two lemmas suggest that forecasts which are used often must be an -Nash equilibrium—
the first lemma suggests that forecasts f which are used often must be equal to π(f ), and the second lemma states
that if this occurs, then f is an -Nash equilibrium. We now make this precise.
Define a forecast f to be asymptotically unused if there exists a continuous test function w such that w(f ) = 1
and 1
T
∑T
t=1 w(ft ) → 0. In other words, a forecast is asymptotically unused if we can find some small neighborhood
around it such that the limiting frequency of using a forecast in this neighborhood is 0.
Lemma 3.6. If f = π(f ), then f is asymptotically unused, with probability one.
Proof. Assume |f −π(f )| = δ > 0. Consider an open ball B centered around f such that for all p ∈ B the following
two conditions hold: (1) |p−f | < δ/4 and (2) |π(p)−π(f )| < δ/4. The first condition just states that all predictions
in this ball are δ/4 close to f , and the second condition states all play distributions which result from this ball are δ/4
close to π(f ). Clearly, such an open ball exists, since π(·) is continuous.
Associate a continuous test function w with this ball that is 0 outside the ball and equals 1 at f , i.e. if p /∈ B ,
w(p) = 0 and w(f ) = 1. Clearly, this construction is possible. We use this w to prove that f is asymptotically
unused.
Using the fact that |f − π(f )| does not depend on t (for the following first equality),(
T∑
t=1
w(ft )
)∣∣f − π(f )∣∣= ∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
w(ft )
(
f − π(f ))∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
w(ft )
(
(f − ft ) −
(
π(f ) − π(ft )
)+ (ft − π(ft )))
∣∣∣∣∣

∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
w(ft )(f − ft )
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
w(ft )
(
π(f ) − π(ft )
)∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
w(ft )
(
ft − π(ft )
)∣∣∣∣∣
 δ
2
T∑
t=1
w(ft ) +
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
w(ft )
(
ft − π(ft )
)∣∣∣∣∣
where the last step uses the fact that if w(ft ) is non-zero, then ft ∈ B , which implies that |ft − f | δ/4 and |π(f )−
π(ft )| δ/4.
S.M. Kakade, D.P. Foster / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 74 (2008) 115–130 125Using the assumption that |f − π(f )| = δ and this previous inequality, we have that:
1
T
T∑
t=1
w(ft )
2
δ
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
w(ft )
(
ft − π(ft )
)∣∣∣∣∣.
Now by Lemma 3.4, the right-hand side must go to zero. Hence, this w proves that f is asymptotically unused. 
We say a set of forecasts Q is asymptotically unused if there exists a continuous test function w such that w(f ) = 1
for all f ∈ Q and 1
T
∑T
t=1 w(ft ) → 0.
Lemma 3.7. If Q is a compact set of forecasts such that for every f ∈ Q, f = π(f ), then Q is asymptotically unused,
with probability one.
Proof. By the last lemma, we know that each q ∈ Q is asymptotically unused. Let wq be a test function which proves
that q is asymptotically unused. Since wq is continuous and wq(q) = 1, there exists an open neighborhood around q
in which wq is strictly positive. Let N(q) be this open neighborhood.
Clearly the set Q is covered by the (uncountable) union of all open neighborhoods N(q), i.e. Q ⊂⋃q∈Q N(q).
Since Q is compact, every cover of Q by open sets has a finite subcover. In particular, there exists a finite sized set
C ⊂ Q such that Q ⊂⋃c∈C N(c).
Let us define the function w = ∑c∈C wc. We use this function to prove that Q is asymptotically unused (we
modifying it later to be a proper test function, i.e. to be a map into the interval [0,1]). This function is continuous,
since each wc is continuous. Also, w  1 for all q ∈ Q. To see this, for every q ∈ Q there exists some c ∈ C such that
q ∈ N(c) since C is a cover. Furthermore, for every c ∈ C, 1
T
∑T
t=1 wc(ft ) → 0 with probability one and since |C| is
finite, we have that 1
T
∑T
t=1 w(ft ) → 0 with probability one.
We complete the proof by modifying w to a proper test function—to map to the interval [0,1]. Define w′(q) =
min{w(q),1} which is continuous, one on Q, and with probability one, 1
T
∑T
t=1 w′(ft ) 1T
∑T
t=1 w(ft )→ 0. There-
fore, w′ proves that Q is asymptotically unused. 
It is now straightforward to prove Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We start by proving that 1
T
∑T
t=1d(ft ,NE) → 0 with probability one. It suffices to prove
that with probability one, for all δ > 0 we have that
1
T
T∑
t=1
I
[
d(NE,ft ) δ
]→ 0
where I is the indicator function. Let Qδ be the set of q such that d(q,NE)  δ. This set is compact, so each Qδ
is asymptotically unused. Let wδ be the function which proves this (which exists by Lemma 3.7). Since wδ(ft ) 
I [d(NE,ft ) δ] (with equality on Qδ), the above claim follows since 1T
∑T
t=1 wδ(ft ) → 0.
The proof of the next two claims in the theorem are entirely analogous. 
The straightforward proof of Corollary 3.3 follows.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. Note that calibration implies 1
T
∑T
t=1 Xt → 1T
∑T
t=1 ft (just take w to be the constant
test function to see this). Now the above statement directly implies that 1
T
∑T
t=1 ft must converge into the set
Convex(NE), which completes the proof. 
4. A deterministically calibrated algorithm
We now provide an algorithm that is uniformly, weakly calibrated for a constructive proof of Theorem 2.1. For
technical reasons, it is simpler to allow our algorithm to make forecasts which are not valid probability distributions—
the forecasts lie in the expanded set Δ˜, defined as:
Δ˜ =
{
f :
∑
f [k] = 1 and f [k]−
}
k∈Ω
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simply project its forecasts back onto Δ (which does not alter our convergence results).
Similar to Section 2.2, consider a triangulation over this larger set Δ˜ with vertex set V , and let V (p) be the corners
of the simplex which contain p. It is useful to make the following assumptions:
(i) If p,q are in the same simplex in the triangulation, |p − q| .
(ii) Associated with each v ∈ V we have a test function wv which satisfies:
(a) If v /∈ V (p), then wv(p) = 0.
(b) For all p ∈ Δ˜, ∑v wv(p) = 1 and ∑v wv(p)v = p.
(iii) For convenience, assume  is small enough (  14|Ω| suffices) such that for all p,q ∈ Δ˜, we have |p − q| 3(whereas for all p,q ∈ Δ, |p − q| 2).
In the first subsection, we present an algorithm, Forecast the Fixed Point, which (uniformly) drives the calibration
error to 0 for those functions wv . As advertised, the algorithm simply forecasts a fixed point of a particular function. It
turns out that these fixed points can be computed efficiently (by tracking how the function changes at each timestep),
but we do not discuss this here. The next subsection provides the analysis of this algorithm, which uses an “approach-
ability” argument along with properties of the fixed point. Finally, we take  → 0 which drives the calibration error
to 0 (at a bounded rate) for any Lipschitz continuous test function, thus proving uniform, weak calibration.
4.1. The algorithm: Forecast the fixed point
For notational convenience, we use μT (v) instead of μT (wv,X,F ), i.e.
μT (v) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
wv(ft )(Xt − ft ).
For v ∈ V , define a function ρT (v) which moves v along the direction of calibration error μT (v), i.e.
ρT (v) = v + μT (v).
For an arbitrary point p ∈ Δ˜, define ρT (p) by interpolating on V . Since p =∑v∈V wv(p)v, define ρT (p) as:
ρT (p) =
∑
v∈V
wv(p)ρT (v) = p +
∑
v∈V
wv(p)μT (v).
Clearly, this definition is consistent with the above when p ∈ V . In the following section, we show that ρT maps Δ˜
into Δ˜, which allows us to prove that ρT has a fixed point in Δ˜ (using Brouwer’s fixed point theorem).
The algorithm, Forecast the Fixed Point, chooses a forecast f ∈ Δ˜ at time T which is any fixed point of the function
ρT−1, i.e.:
(i) At time T = 1, set μ0(v) = 0 for all v ∈ V .
(ii) At time T , compute a fixed point of ρT−1.
(iii) Forecast this fixed point.
4.2. The analysis of this algorithm
First, let us prove the algorithm exists.
Lemma 4.1 (Existence). For all X and T , a fixed point of ρT exists in Δ˜. Furthermore, the forecast fT at time T
satisfies:∑
v∈V
wv(fT )μT −1(v) = 0.
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into, i.e. ρT : Δ˜ → Δ˜ and (2) the mapping is continuous. First, let us show that ρT (v) ∈ Δ˜ for points v ∈ V . We know
ρT (v) = v + 1
T
T∑
t=1
wv(ft )(Xt − ft ) =
(
1 − 1
T
T∑
t=1
wv(ft )
)
v + 1
T
T∑
t=1
wv(ft )(Xt + v − ft ).
It suffices to prove that Xt + v − ft is in Δ˜ (when wv(ft ) > 0), since then the above would be in Δ˜ (by the convexity
of Δ˜). Note that wv(ft ) = 0 when |v − ft | > . Now if |v − ft | , then v − ft perturbs each component of Xt by
at most , which implies that Xt + v − ft ∈ Δ˜ since Xt ∈ Δ. For general points p ∈ Δ˜, the mapping ρT (p) must also
be in Δ, since the mapping is an interpolation. The mapping is also continuous since the wv’s are continuous. Hence,
a fixed point exists. The last equation follows by setting ρT−1(fT ) = fT . 
Now let us bound the summed l2 error, where ‖x‖ = √x · x.
Lemma 4.2 (Error bound). For any X, we have∑
v∈V
∥∥μT (v)∥∥2  9
T
.
Proof. It is more convenient to work with the unnormalized quantity rT (v) = T μT (v) =∑Tt=1 wv(ft )(Xt −ft ). Note
that ∥∥rT (v)∥∥2 = ∥∥rT−1(v) + wv(fT )(XT − fT )∥∥2
= ∥∥rT−1(v)∥∥2 + wv(fT )2‖XT − fT ‖2 + 2wv(fT )rT −1(v) · (XT − fT ).
Summing the last term over V , we have∑
v∈V
wv(fT )rT −1(v) · (XT − fT ) = T (XT − fT ) ·
∑
v∈V
wv(fT )μT−1(v) = 0
where we have used the fixed point condition of the previous lemma. Summing the middle term over V and using
‖XT − fT ‖ |XT − fT | 3, we have:∑
v∈V
wv(fT )
2‖XT − fT ‖2  9
∑
v∈V
wv(fT )
2  9
∑
v∈V
wv(fT ) = 9
Using these bounds along with some recursion, we have∑
v∈V
∥∥rT (v)∥∥2 ∑
v∈V
∥∥rT−1(v)∥∥2 + 9 9T .
The result follows by normalizing (i.e. by dividing the above by T 2). 
4.3. The convergence rate for a given triangulation
Let g be an arbitrary Lipschitz function with Lipschitz parameter λg , i.e. |g(a)− g(b)| λg|a − b|. We can use V
to create an approximation of g as follows
gˆ(p) =
∑
v∈V
g(v)wv(p).
This is a good approximation in the sense that:∣∣gˆ(p) − g(p)∣∣ λg
which follows from the Lipschitz condition, the definition of , and the fact that p =∑v∈V wv(p)v.
We now provide a convergence rate with respect to using this triangulation.
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T
+ 3λg.
More detailed and general convergence rates can be found in Vovk [30], Kakade and Foster [23], where they
consider calibration with respect to specific (and arbitrary) test functions.
Proof. Using the definition of μT (g,X,F ) along with |Xt − ft | 3, we have∣∣μT (g,X,F )∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
gˆ(ft )(Xt − ft )
∣∣∣∣∣+ 3λg = ∣∣μT (gˆ,X,F )∣∣+ 3λg.
Continuing and using our shorthand notation of μT (v),∣∣μT (gˆ,X,F )∣∣=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
∑
v∈V
g(v)wv(ft )(Xt − ft )
∣∣∣∣∣=
∣∣∣∣∑
v∈V
g(v)μT (wv,X,F )
∣∣∣∣∑
v∈V
∣∣μT (v)∣∣

√
|V |
∑
v∈V
∥∥μT (v)∥∥2
where the first inequality follows from the fact that g(v) 1, and the last from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality.
The proof is now completed using these inequalities along with Lemma 4.2. 
4.4. Asymptotically obtaining uniform, weak calibration
We now complete the proof. The outline of the proof is as follows. For any fixed g we can pick  small enough to
kill off λg . This unfortunately implies that |V | is large (since the vertex set size grow with 1/). But we can make T
large enough to kill off this |V |. To get convergence to precisely zero, we slowly increase the grid size and the time
the algorithm is run with each grid. We now make this precise.
Choose a sequence of triangulations {V1,V2, . . .} that has decreasing associated diameters {i} such that i → 0.
The idea is to run the algorithm in phases using the triangulation Vi in the ith phase, and in each phase, the algorithm
is re-run from scratch.
Let Gi be the set of all Lipschitz functions with Lipshitz parameter 1/
√
i . Note that the sets Gi are increasing and
every Lipshitz-function with finite parameter will eventually be contained in one of these sets. Define Ti = |Vi |/i .
Hence, if we ran the algorithm with grid Vi for a time Ti or greater then the calibration error for all functions in Gi
would be bounded by 6√i (from Lemma 4.3).
We wish to guarantee that any time after the end of phase i the calibration of any function in Gi is less than 12
√
i .
To this end, we run phase i for an amount of time such that two conditions are satisfied. The first is that the average
calibration error at the end of phase i (i.e. the average error over all phases, from time 0 to the end of phase i) is no
more than 6√i . The second condition is that the error in phase i + 1 (and subsequent rounds) does not rise above
12√i .
Accomplishing the first condition is straightforward as the error rate is dropping at a uniform rate for functions
in Gi . To accomplish the second condition, we also ensure that we run each phase i for a time which is greater than
Ti+1/(6
√
i). This guarantees that anytime after phase i the calibration error for all functions in Gi will be less than
12√i . To see this, first note that after Ti+1 steps into phase i + 1, the error claim is true (since after Ti+1 steps,
the algorithm has driven the average error in phase i + 1 to be less than 6√i+1 for all functions in Gi+1, which
contains Gi ). However, for the first Ti+1 steps in phase i + 1 we must ensure that the condition is still satisfied.
During this time, note that total time the algorithm has been run is at least Ti+1 + Ti+1/(6√i). Now note that the
fraction of time spent in the phases before phase i + 1 can be bounded by 1 and the average error in these phases was
6√i . Also note that the fraction of time spent in phase i+1 (during the first Ti+1 steps) is Ti+1/(Ti+1 +Ti+1/(6√i))
which is bounded by 6√i and the average error during this time is bounded by 1 (the maximal amount). Hence, the
average overall calibration error during this initial burn in phase (which lasts at most Ti+1 steps) can climb to at most
6√i + 6√i = 12√i .
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12√i . This implies that calibration error for any Lipschitz function (with finite Lipschitz parameter) will go to 0.
The rate is uniform since the time for each phase is fixed.
Our proof is essentially complete, except for the fact that the algorithm F described so far could sometimes forecast
outside the simplex (with probabilities greater than 1 or less than zero). To avoid this, we can project a forecast in Δ˜
onto the closest point in Δ. Let P(·) be such a projection operator. For any f ∈ Δ˜, we have |P(f )−f | |Ω|. Thus,
for any Lipschitz weighting function w we have
μT (w,X,P ◦ F) =
∑
v∈V
w
(
P(ft )
)(
Xt − P(ft )
)=∑
v∈V
w
(
P(ft )
)
(Xt − ft ) +
∑
v∈V
w
(
P(ft )
)(
ft − P(ft )
)
 μT (w ◦ P,X,F ) + |Ω|.
Hence the projected version also converges to 0 as  → 0 (since w ◦ P is also Lipschitz continuous). Theorem 2.1
follows.
5. Discussion
A number of different convergence notions have been recently considered in regard to learning Nash equilibria by
Foster and Young [13], Germano and Lugosi [18], Hart and Mos-Colell [21]. Foster and Young [13] provide a result
in which 1 −  of the time the actual play is some -equilibrium. Hart and Mos-Colell [21] provide an almost sure
convergence result to a single -Nash equilibria, but in a weaker sense—the actual play distribution (conditioned on
the history) may not converge (though the unconditional play distribution does converge). The strongest version of
convergence is provided by Germano and Lugosi [18], in which the actual play almost surely converges to a single
exact equilibrium.
Now in a sense, all of these schemes (including ours) can be viewed as some sort of “distributed” exhaustive
search, since none of these settings provide a convergence rate that is better than just brute force exhaustive search.
However, in our setting, we have some additional guarantees even if some players deviate from the specified protocol
(in Section 3.2)—namely, any player which follows the protocol will have no-regret (as in [11,19]) and will make
calibrated predictions regardless of how the other players behave.
The question then remains as to what stronger forms of convergence are obtainable, while still maintaining the
no-regret property (regardless of how other players behave). Using the fact that weak calibration has a uniform conver-
gence rate (see Section 2), it is relatively straightforward to modify our setting to one where we obtain the guarantees
of Theorem 3.2 with  = 0. The idea is to decrease the  in the continuous best response functions sufficiently slowly.
Hence, the guarantees will be of the form that almost surely (and asymptotically) the actual play will always be close to
some exact Nash equilibrium. However, obtaining convergence to a single exact Nash equilibrium, while maintaining
a no-regret property, is an open problem.
Acknowledgments
We give many thanks to the two reviewers of this paper, who provided many helpful comments.
References
[1] G. Arslan, J.S. Shamma, Distributed convergence to Nash equilibria with local utility measurements, in: Proceedings of 43rd IEEE Conference
on Decision and Control, 2004.
[2] P. Billingsley, Convergence of Probability Measures, John Wiley and Sons, 1968.
[3] G.W. Brown, Iterative solutions of games by fictitious play, in: Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, 1951.
[4] X. Chen, X. Deng, Settling the complexity of 2-player Nash-equilibrium, in: Electronic Colloquium in Computational Complexity, TR05-140,
2005.
[5] C. Daskalakis, P.W. Goldberg, C.H. Papadimitriou, The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium, in: Electronic Colloquium in Computa-
tional Complexity, TR05-115, 2005.
[6] A.P. Dawid, The well-calibrated Bayesian, J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 77 (1982).
[7] A.P. Dawid, The impossibility of inductive inference, J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 80 (1985).
[8] D. Foster, R. Vohra, Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium, Games Econ. Behav. (1997).
[9] D. Foster, R.V. Vohra, Asymptotic calibration, Biometrika 85 (1998).
130 S.M. Kakade, D.P. Foster / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 74 (2008) 115–130[10] D.P. Foster, R.V. Vohra, A randomization rule for selecting forecasts, Oper. Res. 41 (4) (1993).
[11] D.P. Foster, R.V. Vohra, Regret in the on-line decision problem, Games Econ. Behav. (1999) 7–36.
[12] D.P. Foster, H.P. Young, On the impossibility of predicting the behavior of rational agents, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 98 (2001).
[13] D.P. Foster, H.P. Young, Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium, Games Econ. Behav. 45 (2003).
[14] D.P. Foster, H.P. Young, Regret testing: A simple payoff based procedure for learning Nash equilibrium, Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
341–367.
[15] Y. Freund, R. Schapire, Adaptive game playing using multiplicative weights, Games Econ. Behav. 29 (1999).
[16] D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, The Theory of Learning in Games, MIT Press, 1998.
[17] D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, An easier way to calibrate, Games Econ. Behav. (1999).
[18] F. Germano, G. Lugosi, Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young’s regret testing, preprint, 2004.
[19] S. Hart, A. Mas-Colell, A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium, Econometrica 68 (2000).
[20] S. Hart, A. Mas-Colell, Uncoupled dynamics do not lead to Nash equilibrium, Amer. Econ. Rev. 93 (2003) 1830–1836.
[21] S. Hart, A. Mas-Colell, Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium, Technical report, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center
for Rationality DP-371, 2004.
[22] S.M. Kakade, D.P. Foster, Deterministic calibration and Nash equilibrium, in: The Seventeenth Annual Conference on Learning Theory,
COLT, 2004.
[23] S.M. Kakade, D.P. Foster, Calibration via regression, in: The IEEE Information Theory Workshop, 2006.
[24] E. Kalai, E. Lehrer, Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium, Econometrica (1993).
[25] E. Kalai, E. Lehrer, R. Smorodinsky, Calibrated forecasting and merging, Games Econ. Behav. 29 (1999).
[26] S. Mannor, J.S. Shamma, G. Arslan, Online calibrated forecasts: Efficiency vs universality for learning in games, Machine Learning 67 (1–2)
(2007).
[27] P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games, Games Econ. Behav. 3 (1991) 82–100.
[28] D. Oakes, Self-calibrating priors do not exist, J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 80 (1985).
[29] J. Robinson, An iterative method of solving a game, Ann. Math. (1951).
[30] V. Vovk, Non-asymptotic calibration and resolution, in: Proceedings of Algorithmic Learning Theory, ALT, 2005.
[31] H.P. Young, Strategic Learning and Its Limits, Oxford University Press, 2004.
